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INTRODUCTION 
Lawrence B. Solum and Robert W. Bennett's excellent 
book, Constitutional Originalism: A Debate, calls to mind a 
famous book in political philosophy, J.J.C. Smart and Bernard 
Williams's Utilitarianism: For and Against.4 Both works pair two 
spirited yet fair-minded scholars in a constructive debate 
between two competing views prevalent in their fields. 
Originalism has a reasonable, programmatic, and inclusive 
proponent in Solum, and living constitutionalism has a capable, 
pragmatic, and effective champion in Bennett. 
In this essay, I shall not judge the debate between Solum 
and Bennett. Instead, I shall focus on Solum's contribution, 
interpreting it as a new originalist manifesto. I shall extend the 
debate, carrying on what I believe is an equally important debate 
between originalism and what Ronald Dworkin called a "moral 
reading" of the Constitution and what I call a "Constitution-
perfecting theory."5 Some readers may think that Dworkin's and 
1. John Carroll Research Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
2. Nathaniel L. Nathanson Professor of Law, Northwestern University Law 
School. 
3. Professor of Law, The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in 
Law, and Associate Dean for Research and Intellectual Life, Boston University School 
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my approaches are versions of living constitutionalism, but they 
are importantly different from it. I shall suggest that the 
prospects for reconciliation between Solun1's new originalism 
and moral readings are greater than those between his new 
originalism and living constitutionalism. The basic reason is that 
the new originalists and moral readers share a commitment to 
constitutional fidelity: to interpretation and construction that 
best fits and justifies the Constitution. Living constitutionalists 
characteristically are more pragmatic, instrurnentalist, and 
forward-looking in their approaches to the Constitution and, as 
such, tend to be anti-fidelity. This essay will further my book in 
progress, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, which defends a 
moral reading or Constitution-perfecting theory as a conception 
of constitutional fidelity that is superior to originalism, however 
conceived.(\ 
At the outset, I should say that Solum is the ideal scholar 
for the project of writing a new originalist manifesto. He fairly 
concedes many of the flaws in the old originalism, with an 
openness to criticism and a generosity of spirit that are not 
always present in originalists. He candidly grants that originalism 
has evolved-that it is a family of theories rather than one 
coherent, unified view- and that the new originalism is a work 
in progress (pp. 2, 7-11 ). He formulates the new originalism 
inclusively, seeking and articulating common ground among 
competing theories in a constructive spirit. Solurn is somewhat 
unusual in not coming to his originalism for political reasons. 
Many conservatives appear to embrace originalisnn because they 
believe that it will support conservative outcomes. And many 
liberals evidently adopt and adapt originalism because they 
believe that it is their best hope to persuade conservative judges: 
if you can't beat them, join them. Solum has neither motivation. 
He seems to come to his new originalism out of philosophic and 
jurisprudential commitments-not to wage a counter-revolution 
against the liberal Warren Court, but to correct the philosophical 
and jurisprudential excesses and errors of Legal Realism and 
Critical Legal Studies. As a matter of principle, he wants to get 
the theory of interpretation and construction right. For these 
reasons, his project has an admirable and demonstrable integrity. 
In Part I, I evaluate the claim implicit in the title of Solum's 
opening chapter, "We Are All Originalists Now." In Part II, I 
6. JAMES E. FLEMING. FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION (under 
contract with Oxford University Press) (on file with author). 
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explicate Solum's formulation of the new originalism by 
contrasting it with Keith Whittington's. In Part III, 1 explore 
Solum's development of the distinction between interpretation 
and construction. In Part IV, I show the misconceived quest for 
the original public meaning. In Part V, I take up the possibility 
of reconciliation between the new originalism and living 
constitutionalism, suggesting that such prospects are better for 
the new originalism and moral readings. Finally, in Part VI, I 
make explicit the missing (or implicit) argument for the new 
originalism fron1 constitutional perfectionism: an argument 
deriving from the aspiration to fidelity to our imperfect 
Constitution. 
I. ARE WE ALL ORIGINALISTS NOW? EVIDENTLY SO, 
YET DEFINITELY NOT! 
In recent years, many have posed the question, "Are we all 
originalists now?" In response, I have written an article entitled, 
Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Nott By contrast, Solum 
replies with his title, We Are All Originalists Now (p. 1 ). The 
answer to the question depends, as he recognizes, on "what one 
means by originalism" and whether we define it exclusively or 
inclusively (pp. 61-62) (emphasis in the original). 
In defining originalism, Solum distills an elegant framework 
with four basic ideas. It is worth quoting in full: 
• The fixation thesis: The linguistic meaning of the 
constitutional text was fixed at the time each provision 
was framed and ratified. 
• The public meaning thesis: Constitutional meaning is fixed 
by the understanding of the words and phrases and the 
grammar and syntax that characterized the linguistic 
practices of the public and not by the intentions of the 
framers. 
• The textual constraint thesis: The original meaning of the 
text of the Constitution has legal force: the text is law and 
not a mere symbol. 
• The interpretation-construction distinction: Constitutional 
practice includes two distinct activities: (I) constitutional 
interpretation, which discerns the linguistic meaning of 
7. James E. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, 92 TEX. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013). 
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the text, and (2) constitutional construction, which 
determines the legal effect of the text. (p. 4) 
Solum aspires to understand originalism (and, for that matter, 
living constitutionalism) "in their best light-in their most 
sophisticated and defensible versions" (p. 5). I shall come back 
to this Dworkinian-sounding formulation at the end. 
If we define originalism inclusively enough, we might say 
that we evidently are all originalists now. Indeed, we might just 
define originalism so broadly that even I would no longer hope 
that we are not all originalists now! Applying Solum's 
framework, we would conclude that Jack Balkin, with his self-
described living originalist method of text and principle, 
definitely is a new originalist.H Ronald Dworkin, with his moral 
reading of the Constitution, surely also is.9 Sotirios A. Barber 
and I, with our philosophic approach to constitutional 
interpretation (and my own "Constitution-perfecting theory"), 
are as well. 10 So, too, are reasonable, bounded, and grounded 
versions of living constitutionalism. All of these theories 
evidently can accept the four theses quoted above. Under 
Solum's formulation, originalism clearly is a big tent-charitable, 
magnanimous, and inclusionary-rather than the dogmatic, 
scolding, and exclusionary outlook that we see in originalist 
works like Robert Bark's The Tempting of America and Antonin 
Scalia's A Matter of Interpretation.'' 
But if we define originalism so inclusively- and we are all 
now in this big tent-it may not be very useful to say that we are 
all originalists now. We may obscure our differences more than 
elucidating common ground. For we would persist in most of our 
theoretical disagreements-it is just that we would say that the 
disagreements are among varieties of so-called originalism. And 
the debates concerning interpretation and construction, thus 
recast or translated, would go on much as before. 
Despite the implication of his title, Solum's own analysis 
refutes the claim that we are all originalists now. 'Who, from the 
standpoint of his framework, is not a new originalist? First, the 
old originalists are not. As Solum acknowledges, they reject the 
8. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING 0RIGINALISM (2011). 
9. See DWORKIN, supra note 5. 
10. See SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTER-
PRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS (2007); FLEMING, supra note 5. 
11. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION 
OF THE LAW (1990): ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
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public meaning thesis and the interpretation-construction 
distinction thesis (pp. 36, 53-54). For them, interpretation is a 
matter of discovering determinative intentions of the Framers 
and construction is illegitimate government by judiciary. Second, 
many contemporary originalists- those who might not style 
themselves old originalists but who reject the large role that the 
new originalism recognizes for construction- are not new 
originalists. Still, Solum does not exclude these two varieties 
from the big tent of originalism. He says that only two of the 
four commitments are necessary for originalism: the fixation 
thesis and the textual constraint thesis (pp. 35-36). Both of these 
varieties accept these two theses. And at one point, he refers to 
the "truism" of the fixation thesis and the "mundane[ ness]" of 
the textual constraint thesis (pp. 53-54). Here, he implicitly 
admits just how thin and capacious these two theses are, and 
thus how big the tent of originalism is. 
Third, despite Solum's magnanimous gestures toward 
reconciliation of the new originalism with living constitu-
tionalism, he rejects many forms of the latter as beyond the pale. 
He criticizes strong forms of living constitutionalism growing out 
of Legal Realism or Critical Legal Studies precisely because they 
are not originalist, even in his capacious sense: they are 
pragmatic, instrumentalist, and forward-looking, rejecting even 
the relatively thin constraints that the new originalism would 
require of them (pp. 40, 50, 74). For them, evidently, there is 
only construction; interpretation and construction are radically 
indeterminate. He attributes to such living constitutionalists the 
views that the text and original public meaning do not constrain 
interpretation and construction; that constitutional inter-
pretation empowers judges to amend the Constitution; and that 
justice trumps the constitutional text (pp. 19-20, 47-49, 60). He 
ridicules many "so-called theories" of living constitutionalism as 
not being "real theories" but instead "pale imitations, mere 
gestures and hints" (pp. 74-75). In fact, despite the generally 
inclusionary tone of Solum's work, I have not seen such spirited 
attacks on living constitutionalism since reading Bork's The 
Tempting of America and Scalia's A Matter of Interpretation. 12 
Thus, when all is said and done, according to Solum himself, 
we definitely are not all originalists now. 
12. BORK, supra note 11, at 167; SCALIA, supra note 11, at 38-47, 144-49. 
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II. THE NEW ORIGINALISMS 
Next, I shall explicate Solum's understanding of the new 
originalism by contrasting it with Whittington's. 
A. WHAT IS THE NEW 0RIGINALISM? TAKE ONE: 
WHITTINGTON 
What is the new originalism? This question presupposes 
three prior questions: What is the old originalism? Who are the 
old originalists? And why have many constitutional scholars and 
jurists sought to move beyond old originalisrn to the new 
originalism? 
What? The old originalism is an ism-a conservative 
ideology that emerged in reaction to the Warren Court (and 
early Burger Court). Before President Richard Nixon and 
Professor Robert Bark launched their attacks on the Court, 
originalism as we now know it did not exist. Constitutional 
interpretation in light of original understanding13 did exist, but 
original understanding was seen as merely one source of 
constitutional decision making among several-not as a general 
theory of constitutional interpretation, much less the exclusive 
legitimate theory. The old originalists conceive original 
understanding in terms of concrete intentions of the Framers or 
their original expected applications. Accordingly, they argue that 
fidelity in constitutional interpretation requires following the 
rules laid down by, or giving effect to the relatively specific 
original understanding of, the Framers of the Constitution. And 
they argue that these concrete intentions or original expected 
applications are determinative concerning constitutional 
doctrine. 
Who? The old originalists include, most prorninently, Bark 
and Raoul Berger. 14 
Why? The old originalism is vulnerable to dispositive 
criticisms. In his book, Constitutional Interpretation, Keith 
Whittington has forthrightly addressed many of these criticisms, 
fo~ ex~mRle, that it was circular, question--begging, and 
axiomatic.· 
13. In using the word "original understanding," I am not expressing a position on 
the debates between intention of the Framers originalism and original public meaning 
originalism. I am using it as a generic term. 
14. See, e.g, RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977). 
15. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
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What is the new originalism? Who are the new originalists? 
And what is new about their originalism? Whittington provides 
answers in offering a new originalism. Before reading his article 
on "The New Originalism,"16 I had thought that the new, 
improved originalists would be scholars and jurists who seek to 
reconstruct originalism to correct the theoretical flaws of the old 
originalism, or at least to bolster it against powerful criticisms. 
But Whittington, with startling and refreshing frankness, 
provides a rather different account: He says that the new 
originalists are conservatives in power, whereas the old 
originalists were conservatives in the minority! 17 His account of 
the old originalism is quite similar to mine: it emerged as a 
conservative reaction against the Warren Court. 1s Now that 
conservatives have control of the judiciary, Whittington says, 
originalists need to move from being largely reactive and critical 
to developing "a governing philosophy appropriate to guide 
majority opinions, [and] not just fill dissents." 19 Enter the new 
originalism. 
As a governing conservative constitutional theory, 
Whittington suggests, the new originalism "is less likely to 
emphasize a primary commitment to judicial restraint."20 Indeed. 
"First, there seems to be less emphasis on the capacity of 
originalism to limit the discretion of the judge."21 "Second, there 
is also a loosening of the connection between originalism and 
judicial deference to legislative majorities."22 Instead, "[t]he 
primary virtue claimed by the new originalism is one of 
constitutional fidelity, not of judicial restraint or democratic 
majoritarianism."23 In sum, Whittington argues, "[t]he new 
originalism does not require that judges get out of the way of 
legislatures. It requires judges to uphold the original 
Constitution- nothing more, but also nothing less. "24 (I shall 
return to these three arguments for, or asserted virtues of, 
originalism below.) 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999). 
16. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. 1. L. & PUB. POL'Y 599 
(2004). Here I draw from my criticism of Whittington in BARBER & FLEMING. supra note 
10, at 92-93. 
17. Whittington, supra note 16, at 604. 
18. /d. at 599-602. 
19. Jd. at 604. 
20. /d. at 608. 
21. /d. 
22. /d. at 609. 
23. /d. at 608-09. 
24. /d. 
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B. WHAT IS THE NEW ORIGINALISM? TAKE T\VO: SOLUM 
Solum's and Whittington's accounts of the old originalism 
are similar. And their accounts of the new originalism are similar 
in two respects. Solum's new originalism, like Whittington's, 
stresses: (1) original public meaning (as contrasted with the old 
originalists' emphasis on the intention of the Framers or their 
original expected applications), and (2) the significance of the 
distinction between interpretation and construction (as 
contrasted with the old originalists' rejection of construction as 
illegitimate) (p. 36). 
But Solum's new originalism is significantly different. 
Whittington developed his new originalism to replace the old 
originalists' negative reaction against the liberal Warren Court 
with a governing constitutional theory for conservative judges, 
now that they are in power. Solum, by contrast, developed his 
new originalism to overcome the theoretical errors and excesses 
not only of the old originalists but also of Legal Realism and 
Critical Legal Studies. In fact, he wants to acknowledge the 
conservative ideology of the old originalists but to distance that 
from the new originalism as a constitutional theory, and not a 
political ideology (p. 64 ). 
Moreover, Solum's new originalism really is a 
reconstruction to correct the theoretical flaws in the old 
originalism. He rejects most of the old originalists' conception of 
constitutional interpretation as indefensible (pp. 7-11, 20-22). 
He also repudiates the old originalists' conception of the 
Constitution as practically a code of determinate rules and 
concrete expected applications. On his understanding, original 
public meaning is more abstract, vague, and underdetermined-
in part because he conceives some of the Constitution's 
commitments as general standards or abstract principles rather 
than as concrete, determinate rules (pp. 22, 24-25). Further-
more, Solum advances a very different understanding of 
construction than Whittington. For Whittington, at least in his 
initial formulation, interpretation is for judges and construction 
is for legislators and executives.25 For Solum, construction is also 
for judges in developing constitutional doctrine where 
interpretation is underdeterminate (pp. 22-24 ). Solum implicitly 
acknowledges this difference when he characterizes 
Whittington's view as the model of construction as politics (as 
25. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED 
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1-19 (1999). 
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distinguished from Balkin's model of construction as principle): 
with courts deferring in the construction zone and letting 
political institutions do the construction (pp. 69-70). Below I 
suggest that there are similarities between Solum's and Balkin's 
conceptions of construction. 
The upshot-to which I return-is that Solum's new 
originalism is more amenable to reconciliation with moral 
readings than is Whittington's. 
In the next two sections, I assess Solum's new originalism in 
its own right, focusing on the significance of the distinction 
between interpretation and construction and the misconceived 
quest for the original public meaning. 
Ill. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN 
INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 
Let's be clear about what Solum claims about the 
significance of the distinction between interpretation and 
construction. In explaining this distinction, he invokes H.L.A. 
Hart's well-known formulation concerning the core and 
penumbra (p. 22). He presents the core as a zone for 
interpretation and the penumbra as a zone for construction. He 
contends that hard cases, by definition, are underdetermined by 
interpretation of original public meaning and so require 
construction (pp. 22-23). 
Furthermore, Solum says that originalism is a theory of 
interpretation, not a theory of construction. In developing the 
interpretation-construction distinction, Solum plainly states: 
"Originalism itself does not have a theory of constitutional con-
struction" (p. 60). He also states: "Whereof originalism cannot 
speak, thereof it must be silent" (p. 26). Even though con-
struction in hard cases lies beyond interpretation (and thus 
beyond originalism), he claims that the new originalists insist that 
original public meaning should constrain construction (p. 26). 
I shall make two general observations before going further 
into Solum's conception of construction. First, Solum concedes 
that much that is important in constitutional law goes on in the 
construction zone in deciding hard cases and developing 
constitutional doctrine. We might doubt how much of 
importance in constitutional law is resolved through inter-
pretation of original public meaning (a point to which I return in 
showing the misconceived quest for the original public meaning). 
I suspect that Solum would find greater agreement with his 
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analysis of interpretation and construction among living 
constitutionalists and moral readers than among most 
conventional originalists: for living constitutionalists and moral 
readers would agree that hard cases lie in the construction zone, 
and that interpretation of original public meaning does not 
determine the outcomes in these disputes. But old originalists 
and many other contemporary originalists would reject these 
claims as capitulations. Some, like the old originalists, would 
insist that interpretation is determinative both in deciding hard 
cases and developing constitutional doctrine (pp. 20-22). Others 
would deny the necessity or the legitimacy of construction. And 
some who accept the legitimacy of construction would go along 
with Whittington in adopting what Solum calls the model of 
construction as politics: they would say that interpretation is for 
courts and construction is for legislatures and executives (pp. 69-
70). 
Second, what Solum says about how construction should 
proceed- how he proposes to build out doctrine and decide hard 
cases in the construction zone-and about how original public 
meaning should constrain construction even if it does not 
determine it, is compatible with a moral reading. In defending 
this view, I shall focus on two things he says about originalism in 
relation to construction. One, Solum states: "originalists can and 
should agree that constitutional construction (as currently 
practiced) involves a plurality of methods-purposes, structure, 
precedent, and all the rest" (p. 60). He rejects the common living 
constitutionalist argument that the very existence of "multiple 
modalities" shows the impossibility of originalism (p. 59). He 
contends instead that "these methods are properly brought to 
bear on the task of constitutional construction" (p. 60). Thus, he 
practically makes peace with living constitutionalism concerning 
the multiple modalities of argument in the construction zone. 
Whittington recently has taken a similar approach in recognizing 
what he calls "pluralism within originalism" or how originalist 
arguments exist in an environment of "pluralism In 
constitutional interpretation"26 (or, Solum would insist, 
construction). 
Two, Solum mentions three available models of 
construction as eligible within the new originalism (pp. 69-70). 
26. Keith E. Whittington, On Pluralism within Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF 
0RIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 70 (Grant Huscroft & 
Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011 ). 
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1. Construction as politics (associated with Whittington): 
"when judges leave the realm of constitutional 
interpretation and enter the construction zone, they 
defer to the decisions made by the political processes." 
2. Construction as principle (associated with Balkin): "[i]n 
the construction zone, judges should aim to create 
constitutional doctrines that comport with political ideals 
for which the general, abstract, and vague provisions of 
the Constitution aim." 
3. Construction by original methods (inspired by the work 
of John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport but not their 
own view): "when modern courts engage in 
constitutional construction, they should employ" the 
original methods in use when the Constitution was 
adopted. 
Solum does not exactly say which model of construction is 
the most promising for the new originalism that he himself 
proposes. Doing so, I suppose, would be out of keeping with the 
spirit of an ecumenical new originalist manifesto. But, as stated 
above, there are significant differences between Whittington's 
model of construction as politics and Solum's approach to 
construction. For Whittington, again, interpretation is for judges 
and construction is for legislatures and executives. For Solum, by 
contrast, construction is also for judges in developing constitu-
tional doctrine where interpretation is underdeterminative (pp. 
22-23). Furthermore, it does not appear that Solum himself 
would emphasize construction by original methods. I interpret 
him as putting this model forward in the spirit of an inclusive 
manifesto rather than as advocating it as the best approach to 
construction. Finally, there is good reason to believe that Solum 
thinks that Balkin's model of construction as principle is the 
most promising approach for the new originalism that he himself 
advocates. What is more, Balkin's is the most promising model 
for a reconciliation of originalism and living constitutionalism; 
indeed, Balkin calls his new originalism "living originalism."27 
There is also considerable hope for reconciliation between 
the new originalism and moral readings regarding construction. 
First, moral readers like Barber and I deploy a fusion of 
approaches in what Solum calls "the construction zone." "Within 
such a fusion, we . . . understand text, consensus, intentions, 
27. BALKIN, supra note 8. 
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structures, and doctrines not as alternatives to but as sites of 
philosophic reflection and choice about the best understanding 
of our constitutional commitments. ,zR Second, moral readers 
should embrace Balkin's model of construction as the method of 
text and principle. In fact, I have argued that Balkin's theory is a 
moral reading of the Constitution.29 For Balkin conceives the 
Constitution as embodying not only rules but also general 
standards and abstract principles.30 He recognizes that in 
interpreting these general standards and abstract principles, we 
have to make moral and political judgments concerning the best 
understanding of our commitments; history alone does not make 
those judgments for us in rule-like fashion. 31 Moreover, there are 
unmistakable affinities between Balkin's commitment to 
interpret and construct the Constitution so as to redeem our 
faith in its promises and aspirations, and a moral reading's 
commitment to interpret and construct the Constitution so as to 
make it the best it can be.32 
Thus, if Solum's new originalism embraces Balkin's method 
of text and principle- as an approach to interpretation and 
construction -it has much in common with a moral reading. 
In the next section, I raise some doubts about Solum's new 
originalist quest for the original public meaning. 
IV. THE MISCONCEIVED QUEST FOR THE ORIGINAL 
PUBLIC MEANING 
The inspiration for the title of this section is, of course, Paul 
Brest's classic article, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original 
Understanding."33 Solum refers to Brest's article at several 
points (pp. 8, 14, 160). The new originalists may have recon-
ceived the quest of the old originalists-from intention of the 
Framers or their original expected applications to original public 
meaning- but the new quest is likewise misconceived. 
The quest for the original public meaning is misconceived 
because on most important provisions, there will not be a 
definitive original public meaning that will be useful in resolving 
28. BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 10, at 190. 
29. James E. Fleming, The Balkinization of Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 669, 
675-79. 
30. /d. at 676. 
31. BALKIN, supra note 8, at 23-34. 
32. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 255 (1986). 
33. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
REV. 234 (1980). 
2013] BOOK REVIEWS 551 
our disagreements, much less resolving hard cases. Let me give a 
hypothetical example of constitutional amendment and 
interpretation. Let's imagine that, in the near future, the 
Supreme Court overturns Lawrence v. Texai4 - which had 
recognized a right of gays and lesbians to privacy or autonomy-
even as our constitutional culture has accepted it, and has come 
not merely to tolerate but to respect gays and lesbians as equal 
citizens. Let's imagine that We the People then amend the 
Constitution by adopting the following Twenty-Eighth 
Amendment: "Well-ordered liberty being necessary to the 
happiness of a free state, the right to autonomy shall not be 
infringed." 
How would debates about the original public meaning of 
the Twenty-Eighth Amendment likely proceed? Let's distinguish 
two quite different understandings, which parallel recognizable 
disagreements between originalists and moral readers of the 
Constitution. On the one hand, originalists like Scalia, who want 
to construe constitutional language specifically, might say that 
the original public meaning was simply, specifically, and 
exclusively to reinstate the narrow holding in Lawrence. Such 
originalists might say that the Twenty-Eighth Amendment 
protects only the right of gays and lesbians to engage in "deviate 
sexual intercourse," as the Texas statute invalidated in Lawrence 
had put it,35 or the right of gays and lesbians to engage in 
"homosexual sodomy," as Justice White had put it in Bowers v. 
Hardwick,36 which was overruled in Lawrence. On their view, the 
Twenty-Eighth Amendment would be no more abstract a 
commitment to a right to autonomy than that. They would hold 
this view, not because they made an objective historical inquiry 
into original public meaning as a matter of empirical fact, but 
because of prior jurisprudential assumptions and commitments 
about what an original public meaning must be- and about the 
character of the Constitution, constitutional interpretation, and 
constitutional amendment. On their view, that evidently abstract 
language in the Twenty-Eighth Amendment simply has to 
embody specific meanings. 
On the other hand, moral readers, who conceive the 
Constitution as a charter of abstract commitments, would likely 
say that the original public meaning was nothing less than to 
34. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
35. Jd. at 563. 
36. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986). 
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ratify the right to autonomy that the Suprerne Court had 
developed through the line of cases from Meyer and Pierce on 
through Griswold, Roe, Casey, and Lawrence.37 Ivloreover, they 
would claim that the original public meaning was to authorize 
the Supreme Court to go on as it had before in these cases 
elaborating our basic commitment to a right to autonomy. 
Indeed, they might go further and claim that the Constitution, 
properly interpreted, should protect whatever rights of 
autonomy we and the Supreme Court decide over time are 
essential to the concept of well-ordered liberty and autonomy. 
They would take this view, not because they made an objective 
historical inquiry into original public meaning as a matter of 
empirical fact, but because of prior jurisprudential assumptions 
and commitments about the character of the Constitution, 
constitutional interpretation, and constitutional am.endment. On 
their view, that evidently abstract language in the Twenty-Eighth 
Amendment simply has to embody abstract commitments. 
Let's observe that there would be no independent original 
public meaning- as a matter of history- that either side could 
resort to in order to definitively resolve their disagreements. 
Proponents of both understandings of the Twenty-Eighth 
Amendment would claim that their understandings were more 
faithful to the original public meaning. There would not be son1e 
definitive original public meaning of the words "right to 
autonomy" out there in our constitutional culture that would 
resolve our disputes- any more than there is a core public 
meaning of a right to autonomy out there right now. 
Furthermore, there is no lawyerly term of art, "right to 
autonomy," to which we could resort to resolve disagreement 
over the meaning of the right to autonomy. Those who are 
learned in the law vehemently disagree among themselves about 
it-along the lines sketched above-just as citizens disagree. So 
likewise it is with the Equal Protection Clause; the Due Process 
Clause; the Privileges or Immunities Clause; and the First 
Amendment's protections of freedom of speech, freedom of the 
press, and freedom of religion. So it is and ever shall be with 
significant constitutional provisions. 
37. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 55S; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
3S1 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See JAMES E. FLEMING & 
LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 
244-67 (2013) (analyzing this line of cases protecting a "rational continuum" of ordered 
liberty). 
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To make a further point about the misconceived quest for 
the original public meaning, I shall analyze the interpretation of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the Slaughter-House 
Cases. 3x Many constitutional scholars and judges-including 
liberals and conservatives alike, originalists along with moral 
readers- believe that Slaughter-House was wrongly decided. 
Indeed, many believe that it was a travesty. And I'll bet that 
many, if they had a chance to overrule five decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, would include Slaughter-House on their list. But 
I want to ponder for a moment the likely consequences of 
overruling Slaughter-House. I'll even put this in terms congenial 
to new originalists like Solum. Let's imagine that we overrule 
Slaughter-House and commit to return to the original public 
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause (that's the part 
that is supposed to be congenial to the new originalists). And 
let's hypothesize that we agree that the original public meaning 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was that it was to protect 
the fundamental rights "which belong, of right, to the citizens of 
all free governments" (quoting Justice Bushrod Washington's 
famous formulation). 3l) 
What would be the likely consequence of overruling 
Slaughter-House and committing to carrying out the original 
public meaning so conceived? In all likelihood, precious little 
would change. (Sorry to prove to be so uncongenial to the new 
originalists after all.) Let me explain. The Supreme Court's 
gutting of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in Slaughter-
House did not stop the Court from interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment to protect fundamental rights essential to national 
citizenship (of the sort that by hypothesis it was the original 
public meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause to 
protect). As we all know, the Court turned to the word "liberty" 
in the Due Process Clause and to the Equal Protection Clause 
(the fundamental rights and interests strand) to do so. 
For years, people have argued for reviving the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, since its language (and original public 
meaning) more comfortably can bear the work of protecting 
fundamental rights essential to national citizenship. They also 
have argued that doing so would avoid common objections to 
using the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to protect 
38. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
39. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230) 
(Washington, J., riding circuit). 
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such rights. The objections to using the Due Process Clause are 
familiar: it's the Due Process Clause (not the Due Liberty 
Clause). On this view, the government may treat everyone 
poorly, provided it follows established procedures for doing so. 
The objections to using the Equal Protection Clause to protect 
fundamental rights essential to national citizenship are also 
familiar: it's the Equal Protection Clause (not the Just Protection 
Clause). On this view, the government could satisfy its 
requirements by treating everyone equally unjustly. 
What would happen if we were to overrule Slaughter-House 
and revive the Privileges or Immunities Clause as an alternative 
basis for protecting fundamental rights essential to national 
citizenship? Let's imagine that Balkin, a new originalist 
concerned with fidelity to the original public meaning of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, were to propose that we 
reconceive all of the substantive due process and fundamental 
rights equal protection cases as instead interpretations or 
constructions of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. (In fact, he 
has made an argument along such lines.40) 
I in1agine that some readers are thinking that originalists 
like Scalia could never again object to protecting substantive 
fundamental rights on the ~round that the Due Process Clause is 
the Due Process Clause, 1 for the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause does not contain any language to suggest that it would 
protect only processual fundamental rights. And I suppose that 
some readers are thinking as well that Scalia could never again 
object to protecting unenumerated fundamental rights as such, 
on the ground that they are unenumerated.42 A.fter all, the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause does not purport to enumerate 
the fundamental rights essential to national citizenship, such that 
we might infer that if an asserted fundamental right is not 
enumerated it is not protected (leaving aside the Ninth 
Amendment). 
Well, think again. I daresay that Scalia would argue that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only processual rights-
he would argue that the character of our democratic system 
entails that, in the absence of express constitutional provisions, 
the Constitution protects only processual rights. A.nd I daresay 
40. BALKIN, supra note 8, at 183-219. 
41. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 592 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
42. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 980 (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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that Scalia would still object that because the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause does not enumerate the rights it protects, 
Justices are obligated to ignore it, as if its meaning had been 
"obliterated past deciphering by an inkblot," to recall Bork.43 He 
would read the evidence of the original public meaning through 
the lens of his prior jurisprudential assumptions and 
commitments about the character of our constitutional rights (as 
enumerated and processual) as well as about the character of 
interpretation (to be interpretable, a provision must enumerate 
its contents and it must be rule-like rather than abstract 
principle-like). 
And so, notwithstanding a hypothetical overruling of 
Slaughter-House, the arguments about what fundamental rights 
of national citizenship the Constitution protects through the Due 
Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause would likely go on much as before. 
I want to make a final point about what the world probably 
would look like if we were to overrule Slaughter-House, revive 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and commit to carrying out 
its original public meaning. Justice Clarence Thomas indicated 
his openness to doing just that in dissent in Saenz v. Roe.44 
Indeed, he stated there that Slaughter-House's gutting of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause has contributed to what he sees 
as the disarray of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.45 As I 
interpret his dissent, he would overrule all of the substantive due 
process cases, overrule all of the fundamental rights equal 
protection cases, and interpret the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause in light of his conception of its original public meaning. 
What do you suppose Thomas would interpret the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause to protect? I would expect primarily 
economic liberties of the sort Justice Field in dissent in 
Slaughter-House expected it to protect, and of the sort that the 
Supreme Court protected under the Due Process Clause during 
the era of Lochner.46 
The larger point here, again, is that there is no definitive 
original public meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
that, if only we could recover it, would enable us to proceed in 
constitutional interpretation or construction without the 
43. BORK, supra note 11, at 166. 
44. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 527-28 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
45. Jd. 
46. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 
96-97 (Field, J., dissenting). 
556 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 28:539 
disagreements that we presently have. Conservatives like 
Thomas would argue for one set of privileges or immunities of 
national citizenship; liberals would argue for another. Both 
would do so in the garb of fidelity to original public meaning. 
Both would argue that their interpretations are, as Balkin puts it, 
necessary to redeem the promises of the Constitution. 
Disagreement about what fundamental rights are essential to 
national citizenship would continue, much as before, only now 
under the Privileges or Immunities Clause as well as under the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Disagreement about 
the basic character of the Constitution, constitutional 
interpretation, and constitutional amendment would continue 
much as before. The debate, under the guise of arguments about 
fidelity to original public meaning, is a debate among competing 
moral readings of the Constitution. Any quest for original public 
meaning that seeks to deny or avoid the moral reading of the 
Constitution is misconceived. 
V. THE PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION BETWEEN 
THE NEW ORIGINALISM AND LIVING 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (OR MORAL REA.DINGS) 
What are the prospects for reconciliation between 
originalism and living constitutionalism? There is no hope 
regarding the old originalism and even reasonable versions of 
living constitutionalism (p. 67). Again, according to Solum, the 
old originalists believe that interpretation is determinative and 
construction is illegitimate (p. 68). Solum holds out the 
possibility of a "compatibilism" between new originalism and 
certain reasonable versions of living constitutionalism (pp. 67-
69). There would be agreement in broad tern1s concerning 
interpretation in the core and construction in the penumbra (pp. 
67-68). There might be disagreement about how construction 
should be carried out. But there might be broad agreement 
about our constitutional practice as including multiple modalities 
as mentioned above. And there might be broad agreement in 
support of Balkin's living originalist method of text and 
principle. 
The prospects for reconciliation of the new originalism and 
moral readings might be more promising. Again, 1nany versions 
of living constitutionalism, with their pragmatic, instrumentalist, 
and forward-looking attitudes, along with their views of radical 
indeterminacy, are deeply at odds with originalism, however 
conceived. But moral readers like Dworkin and I reject the 
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pragmatic, instrumentalist, and forward-looking attitudes, as 
well as the radical indeterminacy, of such versions of living 
constitutionalism.47 In these respects, such moral readers have 
affinities with Solum's new originalism. And I have already 
shown the general affinities between the new originalism and 
moral readings concerning interpretation and construction. 
As evidence that the new originalists might view moral 
readers as good candidates for reconciliation, consider the 
following. Balkin's living originalism, which is a form of new 
originalism, is also a moral reading.4H Whittington has interpreted 
Dworkin's theory as a form of abstract originalism.49 Solum 
himself, in criticizing what he calls Dworkin's view of the "unity 
of interpretation," constructed an "alternative Dworkin" who 
for all intents and purposes is a new originalist who accepts the 
interpretation-construction distinction.5° Finally, Barber and I 
allowed our philosophic approach to constitutional inter-
pretation to be characterized as an abstract originalism.~' 
I venture to suggest that Solum's reasonable, programmatic, 
and inclusive manifesto has made the new originalism the best it 
can be; as such, it is amenable to reconciliation with a moral 
reading that interprets the Constitution so as to make it the best 
it can be. 
VI. THE MISSING ARGUMENT FROM 
CONSTITUTIONAL PERFECTIONISM (OR FROM THE 
ASPIRATION TO FIDELITY TO OlJR IMPERFECT 
CONSTITUTION) 
Finally, I want to make explicit the missing (or implicit) 
argument for the new originalism from constitutional 
perfectionism: an argument rooted in the aspiration to fidelity to 
our imperfect Constitution. Making this argument will further 
demonstrate the promise for a reconciliation of the new 
originalism and moral readings. Unlike many originalists, who 
47. See BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 10, at xiii (agreeing with Dworkin's moral 
readings approach); DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 7-8 (arguing for the moral reading as the 
"natural [or faithful] reading" of the Bill of Rights). 
48. Fleming, supra note 29, at 675-79 (interpreting Balkin's "living originalism" as a 
moral reading of the Constitution). 
49. Keith E. Whittington, Dworkin's "Origina/ism ": The Role of intentions in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 62 REV. POL. 197. 201 (2000) (interpreting Dworkin as an 
"originalist" who argues that the Founders chose abstract principles). 
50. Lawrence B. Solum, The Unity of Interpretation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 551, 567-77 
(2010). 
51. BARBER & FLEMING. supra note 10, at 82-83, 99. 
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practically assume that originalism- by definition, or 
axiomatically-is the only legitimate approach to constitutional 
interpretation,52 Solum acknowledges the need to make 
normative arguments for originalism (pp. 36-38). l-Ie stresses the 
normative arguments that originalism is more compatible with 
the rule of law and popular sovereignty than competing theories 
(pp. 38-44). 
But Solum's formulation of the new origina1ism undercuts 
both of these arguments. First, his concessions that 
interpretation underdetermines outcomes, and that the develop-
ment of doctrine occurs in the construction zone, undermines his 
rule of law argument that only originalism "guarantees a stable 
core of constitutional doctrine" (p. 41). Indeed, on his account, 
the development of doctrine takes place in the construction 
zone, and originalism does not provide a theory of construction 
(p. 69). Second, Solum's ideas about how we develop doctrine in 
the construction zone also undermines his popular sovereignty 
argument for originalism. For it turns out that "V•le the People" 
when ratifying the Constitution in 1791 or ratifying the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 did not adopt determinative 
answers to our questions (p. 42). And so, in constructing 
doctrine, the new originalists are not simply following the rules 
laid down by "We the People" (p. 42). Thus, even on Solum's 
account, the decisions made by the popular sovereign in the past 
are underdeterminative; to that degree, the argument for 
originalism from popular sovereignty is attenuated. 
Balkin's new originalism stresses a normative argument 
from the aspiration to fidelity to our imperfect Constitution. He 
recognizes that the Constitution in practice is highly imperfect; 
yet he argues that we should interpret it so as to redeem our 
faith in its pron1ises and aspirations.53 Solum should make such 
an argument as well. A form of this argument may be implicit in 
his discussion of the Constitution, imperfections, and injustice. 
As he sees it, we have an imperfect Constitution. It is not so 
unjust that we should override the text of the Constitution in the 
name of doing justice; rather it is reasonably just (pp. 47-50). In 
concluding, I shall suggest that the type of theory he needs for 
this very circumstance of a reasonably just but imperfect 
Constitution is what I call a theory of fidelity to our imperfect 
52. For a criticism of originalists who evidently take it as axiomatically given, see id. 
at 104-07. 
53. BALKIN, supra note~. at 74-tH. 
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Constitution.54 Such a theory aspires to interpret and construct 
the Constitution so as to make it the best it can be (as Dworkin 
and I put it),55 or so as to redeem the promises of the (abstractly 
conceived) original public meaning (as Balkin puts it).:i6 A new 
originalism that incorporated such a conception of fidelity would 
be a new originalism that would be compatible with the best 
form of living constitutionalism- as we see it is in Balkin's living 
originalism. Such a new originalism also would be compatible 
with a moral reading of the sort that Dworkin has developed, 
that Barber and I have advanced in Constitutional Interpretation: 
The Basic Questions, and that I am pursuing in my book in 
progress, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution.57 Solum cites my 
piece that previews this argument: "Fidelity to Our Imperfect 
Constitution" (p. 184 n.69), but he does not explicitly do 
anything with such an argument. 
Solum might object that making such an argument would 
make the new originalism a form of perfectionism (a type of 
theory against which originalism defines itself).5x But we should 
distinguish, with Cass Sunstein, between first-order perfection-
ism and second-order perfectionism. First-order perfectionism 
argues directly for interpreting or constructing the Constitution 
so as to make it the best it can be. Second-order perfectionism 
argues instead that adopting a particular theory of interpretation 
or construction-whatever it is-will make the Constitution the 
best it can be. 59 
Even if Solum is not prepared to sign on with Dworkin and 
me in first-order perfectionism, he should be willing to sign on 
with Sunstein and make a second-order perfectionist case for his 
theory. Indeed, such an argument is implicit in what he says in 
making normative arguments for originalism from the rule of 
law and popular sovereignty. He strongly suggests that applying 
the new originalism will put our Constitution and constitutional 
practice in their best light. Solum should make the argument 
explicit: adopting the new originalisn1 and applying it will make 
54. James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1335 (1997). 
55. !d. at 1354. 
56. BALKIN, supra note 8, at 3. 
57. BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 10; DWORKIN, supra note 5; FLEMING, supra 
note 5. 
58. See Fleming, supra note 29, at 670 (suggesting that the only thing that the many, 
balkanized varieties of originalism agree upon is their rejection of moral readings). 
59. See Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism. 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2867, 
2867-70 (2007). 
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the Constitution and our constitutional practice the best they can 
be. 
At a minimum, Solum could leave it at that. Or, he could 
embrace Balkin's method of text and principle, which is a first-
order perfectionist approach that would interpret and construct 
the Constitution so as to redeem the promises of its 
con1mitments. In doing so, he would put forward a new 
originalism that is compatible with a moral reading or 
Constitution-perfecting theory. That would be the best new 
originalist approach for pursuing the aspiration to fidelity to our 
imperfect Constitution. 
